## Exhibit A Tesla's [Proposed] Surreply

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16		S DISTRICT COURT  OF NEVADA  Case No. 3:18-cv-00296-LRH-CLB  TESLA, INC.'S [PROPOSED] SURREPLY
17 18	VS.  MARTIN TRIPP an individual	TO TRIPP'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF ELON MUSK
19	WIAKTIIV TKIIT, ali liidividual,	
20	Defendant.	
21	AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS	
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1	As set forth in its motion for leave, Tesla files this surreply to address arguments and	
2	materials raised for the first time in Tripp's reply brief. See lloane v. Commissioner, No. 3:09-CV-	
3	00243-RCJ-(RAM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71808, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2010) ("Because	
4	Plaintiff's reply raised issues not in his initial motion, the Court grants Defendant leave to file a	
5	surreply and will consider Defendant's arguments raised in its surreply"). Tripp's reply brief	
6	improperly introduces a deposition transcript from an unrelated case and for the first time cites to	
7	transcript of a case management conference but omits key statements regarding this Court's ruling	
8	A. Tripp quotes this Court but ignores this Court's ruling and the case law cited	
9	in Tesla's opposition.	
10	In his reply, Tripp selectively quotes from the transcript of this Court's December 3, 2018	
11	case management conference to support his argument. (ECF 119 at 2.) But the full transcript, which	
12	Tesla attaches as Exhibit 1, shows the Court ordered Tripp to engage in the very discovery that	
13	Tesla demonstrated he failed to do. (ECF 112 at 8-14.)	
14	Specifically, the Court directed "the parties to do <i>extensive</i> , you know, initial discovery	
15	before you get to the point of even doing a notice for [Musk's] deposition." (Ex. 1 at 28:8-10;	
16	emphasis added.) The Court went on to explain:	
17	And by that I mean, are there other employees at Tesla that can be	
18	interviewed? Is there a 30(b)(6) witness that could be deposed that may be able to answer some of the questions that are at issue? Have	
19	any interrogatories been issued? Have there been any requests for admission that have been propounded specific to Mr. Musk's	
20	statements? So, I'm not going to make any decisions with any kind of prejudice, and I am inclined that if we get to that point we	
21	will go ahead and have some additional briefing, because I expect	
22	that the facts are going to change fairly significantly from where we are today to where we would be at that point given the discovery that	
23	I would hope would occur	
24	So, to be clear, my ruling is essentially that the parties <i>need to do</i>	
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26	notice be given	
27	( <i>Id.</i> at 28:10-16; 29:10-13 (emphasis added.) Tripp simply did not do this. (ECF 112 at 8-14.)	
28	Tripp then relies on the hearing transcript to argue that because Musk made some of the	

statements in question, he can be deposed without consideration of the apex doctrine. (ECF 119 at 3.) But Tripp *ignores* the many cases cited in Tesla's opposition that did not allow depositions of high-ranking executives although they, too, had made relevant statements—cases that were not before this Court at the case management hearing. (ECF 112 at 7-8.) Tripp also ignores Musk's declaration that his statements were entirely based on information provided to him by others. As set forth in the cases in Tesla's opposition, statements conveying information provided by others is simply part and parcel of a CEO's job as the "public face of the company," and even where a CEO made relevant statements, plaintiffs must show that they cannot obtain the required information through less intrusive means. (Id.).

## В. Reliance on the deposition transcript in another litigation is improper.

Tripp's submission of a deposition from an entirely unrelated lawsuit is not only irrelevant but violates the rule that "new material does not belong in a reply brief." Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838, 846 (9th Cir. 1976). It is also further evidence of how far afield Tripp intends to take Musk's deposition. Moreover, the few, highly-selective quotations plucked from a sevenhour deposition—most of which are one-liners and which appear to take at most 10 minutes in total—are **no** indication that questions were not fully answered. (In fact, the questions were fully answered in that deposition, and it was completed with no motion practice.)

Tripp originally said he needed four hours. Now, based on less than 10 minutes of colloquy in another case, he claims to need an additional three hours. This is not credible. It is similar to Tripp not deposing the key witnesses with direct knowledge of the key facts and not serving relevant discovery requests (as this Court ordered) and instead demanding Musk's deposition. Musk should be protected from this gamesmanship.

## C. Conclusion

Other than these improper arguments, Tripp's reply is remarkable for its utter failure to address Tesla's arguments and case law. His request for Musk's deposition should be denied.

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4	i	Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Tesla, Inc.	
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	TESLA, INC.'S OPPOSITION TO TRIPP'S		

**Exhibit 1 to Tesla Surreply Transcript of December 3, 2018 Case Management Conference** 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
DISTRICT OF NEVADA (RENO)				
TESLA, INC,	) CASE NO: 3:18-CV-00296-LRH-CBC			
Plaintiff	, ) CIVIL			
vs.	) Reno, Nevada			
MARTIN TRIPP,	) Monday, December 3, 2018			
Defendant	. (9:01 a.m. to 9:43 a.m.)			
TELEPHONIC	CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE			
	NORABLE CARLA BALDWIN CARRY STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE			
APPEARANCES:				
For Plaintiff:	ALLISON L. LIBEU, ESQ.			
	JOHN C. HUESTON, ESQ.			
	Hueston Hennigan, LLP 523 W. 6th Street, Suite 400			
	Los Angeles, CA 90014			
For Defendant:	WILLIAM M. FISCHBACH, III, ESQ. Tiffany & Bosco			
	2525 E. Camelback Rd. Phoenix, AZ 85016			
Court Reporter:	Recorded; Digital			
Courtroom Administrator:	LGM			
Transcribed by:	Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc. P.O. Box 8365 Corpus Christi, TX 78468 361 949-2988			

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

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appreciate how well the documents have been drafted and how
thorough they are. It really does help me a lot in having
these hearings, so I just want to start with that. So, thank
you both for that.
          I think the best thing to do is I'm going to -- I
have a series of questions for both parties, and I'm just going
to go through the issues listed, and I think I'll go off of the
issues listed from Tesla's case management because there's more
issues in theirs, but they overlap with the issues that have
been presented by Mr. Tripp.
          But let me start with this, and I'll start with
plaintiff's counsel. Have the parties met and conferred
subsequent to the filing of the case management reports?
                                                         And I
believe, if I'm correct, it's Ms. Libeu?
          MS. LIBEU: Yes, your Honor. And just for the
record, John Hueston of Hueston Hennigan has joined for
plaintiffs, as well.
          THE COURT:
                     Okay.
          MR. HUESTON: Good morning, your Honor.
          THE COURT: Good morning.
          MS. LIBEU: Counsel for both sides met and conferred
since we submitted those case management reports to your Honor.
I think there are some issues where, you know, we've been able
to resolve, and, then, I think there are some that still
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FRCP 35 exam that have not been resolved.

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1 premature since no depositions had yet been noticed.

counterclaimant and defendant, Mr. Tripp?

So, let me start with Ms. Libeu. Have depositions now been noticed by the plaintiff at this -- or the

MS. LIBEU: Mr. Tripp hasn't noticed any depositions. We've noticed some depositions, but we -- for the record, your Honor, we do agree that this is something that it's premature and that we think the law requires him to exhaust his ten to then determine whether he really needs more.

THE COURT: Mr. Fischbach, do you have anything to add to that, sir?

MR. FISCHBACH: Judge, I think the simplest solution is for us to do ten depositions and then concur with Tesla, so then it could be that, you know, that Tesla might be fine with a stipulation to exceed the ten dep. And we agree it's a little premature on that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that was sort of my sense is that until -- and I guess I would say, to the extent that -- I think you're both saying this, but I think that some of the depositions and things like that, the discovery aspects of this need to be exhausted before we get to the question of whether or not more depositions beyond the ten should be scheduled. So, I would ask that the parties exhaust that discovery at this point, but to the extent that this becomes an issue, we can certainly address that when it seems more ripe for review at

1 that point with the parties. So, we will table that issue.

And I should state for the parties, based on my review of everything, I do think it makes sense to have a subsequent case management conference in, say, early February, and I'll set that at that time. But, to the extent that there's issues that remain or issues that need to be revisited, we'll revisit those at that next case management to hopefully ensure that parties don't have to file extensive motions to compel and other discovery-related motions. So, that will be tabled until the next case management conference, and, to the extent that it needs to be raised at that time, we can discuss it then.

Moving to the issue number two, heading number two in the case management report of Tesla, and this has to do with the location of Mr. Tripp's deposition. Let me start with this. I agree that, as a plaintiff in this case, a counter plaintiff, he would be required to have his deposition in a location in the forum where the case is proceeding. I am not convinced that this is a compulsory counterclaim because it relates to issues and things that happened subsequent to the trade secrets issues that really form the basis of Tesla's claims. But with that being said, I do think that there is a middle ground for everybody to work off of, because in all my -- in all reality, he's actually being deposed as both a plaintiff but also as a defendant.

So, have the parties talked or discussed this any further and has any movement been made? And I'll start with Ms. Libeu.

MS. LIBEU: We discussed, your Honor, and the parties, I think, just agreed to disagree on this point on the deposition. We, obviously, think Mr. Tripp should appear in the forum, but we're amenable to another mutually convenient location, realizing that his counsel aren't in Nevada; they're, I think, in Arizona, and we'd be amenable to a different location than the forum in the United States; we just don't think it's appropriate to have to travel to Hungary to take his deposition.

THE COURT: Well, I will say that that's not going to happen. So, that -- that will not be ordered by the Court regardless of whatever the resolution would be. I think that would make absolutely no sense to have, you know, the only person who doesn't travel be Mr. Tripp, under the circumstances, especially because, as I already indicated, I do not see these as compulsory counterclaims. But I do think that there's a middle ground for the parties to work on in order to come to a better resolution.

I'll also state, for the record, I'm not inclined, nor will I likely grant, any type of videoconference deposition. I think that this is the type of deposition, especially if you are proceeding towards trial, where, as

counsel -- and I would say both for plaintiff and defendant -it's going to be important to see how he is as a witness. And
that would be very difficult to see the nuances of how someone
responds, the inflections of their voice, the way that they
appear; it's just simply not something you can readily observe
on a videoconference. So, that would not be allowed. However,
I do think that the parties should be able -- and I will also
say, for the record, that I think that being able to prepare
Mr. Tripp would be nearly impossible if the deposition didn't
occur in the United States and his counsel weren't able to sit
down with him and to go over the documents.

So, with all of that being said, I would ask for the parties to meet and confer again to try to figure out if there is another location in the United States, and maybe Arizona would make the most sense, because that is where his counsel's offices are, and that's where he's been directed to review documents in person under the protective order. But I think at this point I think I've made it pretty clear what my inclinations are on this, so I would ask the parties to meet and confer on that again to try to come up with a resolution on how that should be handled.

Is this a deposition that you anticipate taking before the February time frame for another case management conference?

MS. LIBEU: It may or may not, but it certainly would

- 1 be around that time, assuming your Honor grants the stipulation
- 2 to extend the discovery deadline. We are talking January,
- 3 February for depositions, in terms of availability of
- 4 Mr. Tripp. We'll, obviously, work with him on the time period,
- 5 so it may or may not need to be before that February date.
- 6 THE COURT: Well, I should say -- I should have
- 7 stated, for the record, I do intend to sign that. I do have
- 8 some questions, though, about whether it's enough time, to be
- 9 totally frank with the parties, given everything that's going
- 10 on in this case. So, but at the minimum, I'm going to agree to
- 11 | the dates that you've already stipulated to.
- So, Mr. Fischbach, is there anything that you'd like
- 13 to add, sir, with respect to that?
- MR. FISCHBACH: No, Judge. I think we'll meet and
- 15 | confer again, and I think Arizona does -- at least does make
- 16 | some good sense. I'll be candid. I mean, our -- we were
- 17 | hoping Tesla might agree to contribute to his travel expenses,
- 18 | you know, given the kind of a -- of the disparity of financial
- 19 resources here, but it's something I can take up with Ms. Libeu
- 20 | in a separate meet and confer. We are targeting -- we're
- 21 | trying to kind of line up as many depositions as we can kind of
- 22 | back to back, and that's why we're targeting January, February.
- In terms of an extension on the discovery time frame,
- 24 | that was what Tesla was willing to agree to. I tend to agree
- 25 | with your Honor that probably more time is going to be needed,

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but as for now that's what Tesla would agree to, and it's very possible the issue may come up again.

THE COURT: Well, I only say that because my preference is to have people get dates that are realistic so we're not having constant motions and stipulations filed. And, in all reality, I think that, you know -- like I said, I'm okay with the dates that you have. I just want to make sure that it's enough time to get this done, because I'm not inclined to grant extension after extension after extension. And, so, that's why I would make that caveat.

I would ask that the parties meet and confer and to discuss even if there is any kind of fee splitting that could be agreed to by the parties. Like I said, he's not being deposed simply as a plaintiff or a counterclaimant. He's also being deposed as a defendant in the case. Now, of course, I don't know that the rule requires any of those things, but I think that there's ways to mutually agree on some way to get this to a resolution without it needing to be brought to the Court's attention again. But what I will say is this, again, meet and confer on this, and if you can't reach a resolution -if you plan on doing a deposition before our next meet and confer, I would ask that the parties file something in which it's a joint document simply stating that the parties can't agree on this particular issue and line out just in a couple of paragraphs what your respective positions are, where you're at,

- 1 and we can try to schedule a teleconference as soon as
- 2 possible, so if you do try to get the deposition done before
- 3 our next case management conference, we can have that resolved.
- 4 But if you can wait until the next case management conference,
- 5 | if you're unable to agree, we can just address it there.
- 6 So, any questions, Ms. Libeu, on the Court's position
- 7 on that?
- 8 MS. LIBEU: No. Thank you, your Honor.
- THE COURT: And Mr. Fischbach?
- 10 MR. FISCHBACH: Well, Judge, maybe a suggestion;
- 11 during this meet and confer maybe would be a good time for the
- 12 parties to discuss another extension on discovery, and I don't
- 13 | know if the Court can hold off on signing the order until we've
- 14 maybe met -- or come up with a different date, because --
- 15 | because I'll agree, doing kind of repetitive extensions are
- 16 usually kind of a -- are problematic, and I'd prefer that we
- 17 kind of get together and stake out a good discovery cutoff date
- 18 | that's realistic and then kind of back that into a subsequent
- 19 filing.
- 20 **THE COURT:** Okay. Well, let's table the question of
- 21 | the extension and stipulation until the very end, and then we
- 22 can discuss that, and that way it can give Ms. Libeu an
- 23 opportunity to speak to that issue. But let's move to the next
- 24 issue in the case management. But thank you for that,
- 25 Mr. Fischbach. I do appreciate that.

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With respect to the deposition of the wife, I agree Rule 45 does not extend to overseas depositions. I don't know that your subpoena would even be effective. It's been my experience you would have to go through the process of getting what we call an MLAT in order to be able to do that. difficult thing to do. I also am unclear as to whether or not she really is going to be called as a witness or whether or not she simply was placed on the initial disclosure list. However, with that being said, she certainly appears to be somebody that would have information that would be relevant to the case, particularly as it relates to Mr. Tripp's alleged emotional distress, any pressure that this put on the marriage or impact to him; you know, she would be able to talk about her observations in terms of how this affected him. And with that being said, spousal privilege, which is something brought up by Tesla, that is a very narrow privilege in the state of Nevada. It only extends to communications. So, specifically, things that were said between the parties would be privileged under spousal privilege. However, to the extent that she observed anything, she experienced anything personally, anything of that nature, that's all fair game. That is not covered by privilege. So, I guess, the question -- and I'll start with Mr. Fischbach as to this, which is, is this a witness that you anticipate actually calling and relying on for purposes of this

1 | case at trial?

MR. FISCHBACH: Well, we're not entirely certain right now, your Honor. We did identify her as a party with knowledge, but for purposes of this call, I don't want to (indisc.) position that we don't intend to call her.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FISCHBACH: So, we would certainly reserve the right to call her. And to that end, I do believe that we would invoke the privilege with respect to any communications, but I agree with the Court that, you know, what she observed, what she herself experienced, I think that is fair game to the extent she was called as a witness in trial.

to any sort of loss of consortium type claim? I don't recall seeing it that specifically alleged, but is that part of the emotional distress and the pressure on the marriage that's -- I apologize; this is so personal, but I do think it goes directly to who else would be a witness to that other than Mr. Tripp. So, can you elaborate on that at all, Mr. Fischbach, or is this not a good time for that?

MR. FISCHBACH: Oh, it's a good time, Judge. You know, loss of consortium is an interesting claim, because it's a derivative claim, so, obviously, she's not asserting a loss of consortium claim. And to the extent, you know, Mr. Tripp is -- I wouldn't say we're asserting a -- I don't know that

- 1 Mr. Tripp could necessarily assert a loss of consortium claim
- 2 | because it did claim it's not derivative. But I do suspect
- 3 | that he would testify that it's put a stress on the marriage.
- 4 But, other than that, I think that's going to be the extent of
- 5 | it.
- THE COURT: I guess what I was thinking in terms of a middle ground on this, to the extent that this particular
- 8 individual could be a witness, I would suggest that Tesla
- 9 propose interrogatories or even a written deposition of sorts
- 10 to this particular witness to get information as to what she
- 11 | really does know and what would likely be invoked in terms of
- 12 privilege, and then we can revisit whether or not we need to
- 13 address this in any more depth beyond that.
- 14 Is there any objection to that, Ms. Libeu?
- MS. LIBEU: No, I think that's fine, your Honor. We
- 16 can do that and then address it secondarily. In addition, I
- 17 | think Mr. Fischbach and I can probably meet and confer on a
- 18 deposition, whether this one might be one where telephonic
- 19 | would be appropriate.
- 20 THE COURT: Okay. Well, that -- let's add that to
- 21 | your list, for lack of a better word, for the meet and confer
- 22 as to whether or not that's something that you can start to
- 23 | work on to resolve. My guess is that even at the meet and
- 24 | confer that might be a bit even premature until you've
- 25 propounded some deposition -- or at least some questions

1 | through interrogatories or even a written deposition before

2 | that. But I would suggest that you put that on the list, and

3 to the extent that that can't be resolved by our February meet

4 and confer or case conference, then we can address that in more

5 detail at that point.

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Anything further on that, Ms. Libeu?

MS. LIBEU: No. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fischbach?

MR. FISCHBACH: No, your Honor.

of Mr. Tripp. I think we have two last issues. And I have to be frank. I think that given the fact that this particular individual is making a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, my inclination is that an independent exam would make sense. The question I have for Mr. Fischbach is, are -- is he alleging continued emotional distress or emotional distress that -- you know, prospective emotional distress, as well as what he went through at the time? Because I think that may change the analysis to some extent.

Mr. Fischbach?

MR. FISCHBACH: You know, Judge, it's a tough question, as -- as I'm not -- I don't have a degree in psychology or psychiatry. Obviously, the events themselves were very traumatic for Mr. Tripp. You know, does he still -- does it still kind of impact him today? Yes, it does, but I

- 1 | think that's -- that can be said about any traumatic experience
- 2 that you had in the past. I mean, that -- you know, that --
- 3 speaking as a veteran, that's kind of the nature of PTSD. If
- 4 you have a traumatic event, and it typically lingers, you know,
- 5 | for various periods and various degrees of intensity. But
- 6 | we're not making a claim that he is, for example, declaring
- 7 | future mental health treatment. He is not under the care of
- 8 any kind of mental health care provider at this point in time.
- 9 And, so, that's why we thought that the Rule 35 examination was
- 10 going a little too far given the extent of the claim.
- 11 THE COURT: Well, I guess that, with that
- 12 explanation, I tend to agree. I think that the question of
- 13 | having a medical exam really relates more to what is currently
- or ongoing, you know, medical issues related to a claim;
- 15 | whereas, if we're talking strictly about things that are more
- 16 specific to the past, it seems to me that -- or the discovery
- 17 | process itself would -- or at least eliminate those issues
- 18 | through medical records or other types of, you know, evidence
- 19 that relates specifically to how his mental state was around or
- 20 about the time that all of this was happening.
- 21 So, my question to Ms. Libeu is, has there been
- 22 discovery requests propounded related to his medical history,
- 23 his medical records? Have any of those things been provided,
- 24 and is there a need at this time for that medical exam in light
- 25 of what you've received or not received?

MS. LIBEU: Two things, your Honor. We have propounded discovery on that issue. They have produced no medical records because they've said he never sought medical, so there is no documentary evidence on this issue whatsoever.

And we've also asked questions about whether he's ever been prescribed medication, taking medication, whether prescribed or not, those things, and all of the answers have been no, no, no. And there is no real evidence, other than what's in his head.

And, additionally, I will say in paragraph 98 in the

And, additionally, I will say in paragraph 98 in the counterclaim, Mr. Tripp alleges that he has suffered and, quote, "continues to suffer emotional and mental distress and pain and suffering." So, not only is it something that we can only get from a examination of him, he does actually allege continuing emotional distress in his counterclaims.

One other thing that we have been waiting on but haven't received is in the initial disclosures there's supposed to be a calculation of what he claims his damages are. The initial disclosures -- we've gotten a few amended sets, but the damages calculation still says that Mr. Tripp is calculating it and will get it to us at some point. So, we still haven't received that. So, we've really gotten no information from him, which is why we need the exam.

In addition, he's not -- he's alleging some sort of compensatory damages that we don't know, and punitive. So, to fully and fairly be able to defend ourselves from what his

claims are, we have propounded discovery. There isn't anything other than what's in his head for us to get at. This is why we need the -- the exam.

THE COURT: Mr. Fischbach? Any response?

MR. FISCHBACH: Several, Judge. I think that whatever is in Mr. Tripp's head can be obtained via a deposition. He doesn't need to sit for an independent medical examination for that purpose. In fact, we are particularly concerned that Tesla would (indisc.) fact and, you know, misuse it tactically and say that there is something that he's -- that he -- she's somehow been trying to (indisc.) some kind of mental deficit or liability, and as a result, the judge made him sit for a mental exam. I'm very concerned that that could be used to prejudice Mr. Tripp, all for very, very little evidentiary gain to Tesla.

With regard to the damages calculations, I think your Honor is aware that, you know, unlike a liquidated claim for damages in a breach of contract case or some -- or any other kind of commercial case, that the case law is very clear that damages in cases are defamation, (indisc.) invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress; those are presumably within the province of the fact finder. And it's true there are times that you can assert, you know, a financial loss. For example, you could allege that the defamatory statement caused you to miss out on employment or something

- like that. But we're not -- we're not claiming that. With regard to punitive damages, that -- that goes more to the state of mind of the -- to Tesla than it does to Mr. Tripp.
  - So, again, Judge, I think at this point in time a
    Rule 35 exam, at a minimum, is highly premature. And I don't
    think it's going to be necessary given that we're not asserting
    that Mr. Tripp needs long-term mental health healthcare
    treatment; we're not intending to call a psychiatrist, so -- to
    talk about the impact of Tesla's conduct. If either of those
    were true, then a Rule 35 exam might make good sense, but not
    under these circumstances.

experience with litigating the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and what I would say is that I think it's very difficult to do that under Nevada law absent some medical records that show that there really was extreme and severe emotional distress. And when you're trying to defend a case like that, without any sight of medical records, I think that puts the defense in this case, which would be Tesla because this is a counterclaim, at a very extreme disadvantage. And how you would even deal with that if you can't get into the question of what really is the emotional distress, because that's been put at issue now by Mr. Tripp, not Tesla. So, to the extent --

MR. FISCHBACH: (indisc.)

THE COURT: Well, let me finish.

2 MR. FISCHBACH: It --

**THE COURT:** Let me finish.

MR. FISCHBACH: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: So, to the extent that that's been put at issue, I think that, at the very minimum, before we can really discuss this in any real substance, is there needs to be some discovery. What is the status of his medical records and information related to that? I mean, has he sought out any kind of mental, you know, health assistance as a result of what he claims to be the actions of Tesla? Because if that isn't the case, then I think that there is a defense to whether or not this is a severe and extreme emotional distress such that it would be compensable under Nevada law.

So, I'm going to ask the parties do this. I would ask that Mr. Fischbach respond to the discovery requests that have been made by Tesla as it relates to the medical records to provide them that information. I would also want to make sure that any evidence that you have will lead specifically to whether or not this has been a severe and extreme, what that conduct is exactly, and how that's been a severe and extreme emotional distress, you know, what those symptoms have essentially resulted in, and at that point the parties should meet and confer to discuss whether or not Tesla still believes that it needs this mental examination. And if at that point

- the parties can't agree, then we'll have this discussion, but one thing I would like to do is to make sure that if we are
- 3 going down that road, that this is scheduled at the same time
- 4 that Mr. Tripp is already in the United States. So, we need to
- 5 make sure that we get this resolved ahead of his deposition.
- 6 So, I guess, with that being said, this would be
- 7 another issue, I think, for the parties to meet and confer
- 8 over, but I think it requires first that Mr. Fischbach and the
- 9 plaintiff provide the necessary discovery to Tesla for Tesla to
- 10 be able to review that before you meet and confer over what
- 11 | would necessarily be required for a Rule 35 examination.
- 12 Is there any questions for plaintiff on that,
- 13 | Ms. Libeu?
- 14 MS. LIBEU: No questions, your Honor; only just a
- 15 | comment that we have asked for medical records and we've been
- 16 | told there aren't any. So, I don't know what, if anything,
- 17 Mr. Fischbach can provide in that area.
- 18 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fischbach, do you want to
- 19 respond to that?
- 20 MR. FISCHBACH: Frankly, Judge, I was going to raise
- 21 the same concern, that there are no medical records, he has not
- 22 | sought any kind of treatment. He may do so in the future, and
- 23 | if he does, we'd, obviously, disclose those records. So,
- 24 | it's -- there is nothing to provide in response to a request
- 25 | for medical records.

THE COURT: Have there been any interrogatories that have been propounded specific to these questions of the elements under the IIED claim?

MS. LIBEU: Yes, your Honor. We have propounded interrogatories on whether he sought medical treatment, what he's done in terms of, in the past, whether he's had similar issues, whether he's taken medication, whether prescribed or not, for his alleged emotional distress, and all of the answers have essentially been no, no, no. He hasn't alleged an emotional -- he hasn't alleged that he has an emotional illness. So, that's something we do need to confer on given that the answers are a little conflicting with the fact that he's got an emotional distress claim out there.

THE COURT: Well, there's -- you know, and to be clear on the record, there is a distinction between having emotional distress that would be part of and parcel to, you know, the defamation and false-light related claims. There is another, different standard that would apply in the IIED round, which is going to be severe and extreme emotional distress. So, those two things are actually different, especially under Nevada law.

So, I think at this point why don't you again meet and confer with this issue, because, I have to be honest with you, based on what I'm hearing just from counsel, I think an IIED claim without any evidence to really establish severe and

- 1 extreme emotional distress, where there's no medical records,
- 2 | there's no history, no evidence that someone actually sought
- 3 out any help as a relation to that particular claim, that would
- 4 be a hard claim to survive on motion for summary judgment.
- 5 Just -- just throwing that out there. I'm not necessarily the
- 6 one that's going to decide that, but that would be a difficult
- 7 | claim to pursue.

So, I think at this point, I think the parties should meet and confer over exactly what it is that -- how this claim's going to proceed. And I do think that, Mr. Fischbach, there is going to have to be some disclosure and discovery as to what exactly it is that is being alleged is so severe and extreme that would support an IIED claim. And if you can't establish that, that's a problem bigger than the emotional or the mental examination question. And at that point I'm not sure if Tesla would want to have the mental examination, because it may not be necessary if there can't be a showing that there was extreme and severe emotional distress in the first instance.

Now, to the extent that there's other emotional distress that's not severe and extreme, I guess the question again goes back to whether or not there's allegations of future emotional distress or future damage that was done. In that type of instance, I'm not sure that a mental examination is really necessary to go down that road. Based on what's been

said, I know that there was the allegation in -- what is it -paragraph 93, but I do think that the parties should meet and
confer and try to resolve some of these issues, and we can
revisit this at the next case management conference. I guess
at this point I would ask that Mr. Tripp's deposition not be
scheduled until after that time so we can resolve some of these
issues to the extent they need to be resolved.

Is there any question on that, Ms. Libeu?

MS. LIBEU: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fischbach, is there anything you'd like to add, sir? I'm sorry; I think I may have cut you off.

12 MR. FISCHBACH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Perfect.

That takes us, then, to the deposition of Elon Musk. Let me state this for the record. I do not believe that he would fall within the apex rule. And the reason for that is this is not a case where a corporation is being sued in relation to something that this particular individual doesn't have personal knowledge of. The very allegations that, as I read them, in the counterclaim particularly relate specifically to statements, emails, tweets that came directly from Mr. Musk. So, to the extent that he has personal knowledge of the actions taking place in this case and, in particular, the fact that his own statements, as I understand them, are what raised the basis for the defamation and false-light claims themselves, that

- 26 1 makes this different than most cases where the apex rule has 2 been used to prevent the deposition of a CEO or other highlevel corporate executive. So, in this particular case, I do 3 4 not agree that he would be protected under the apex rule. 5 Now, with that being said, I do think that we are not 6 going to allow an extensive deposition; we're not going to 7 allow the deposition to be taken in Kansas or something to, you 8 know, somehow harass or otherwise take away Mr. Musk from his 9 daily activities as the CEO of Tesla. 10 So, with that being said, is there anything, 11 Ms. Libeu, that you would like to add to this issue? MS. LIBEU: Just very briefly, your Honor. 12 13 Mr. Musk's deposition hasn't been noticed or 14 subpoenaed, so we think technically this issue isn't even ripe 15 for resolution. What we would like to have is, once it's 16 noticed, have the opportunity to file a formal briefing on the 17 issue, including to address the issues on ways in which we think the deposition, if ordered, should be limited so it 18 19 doesn't turn into something that is beyond really the pale of 20 this case.
- 21 THE COURT: Well --
- 22 We would -- we would request that MS. LIBEU:
- 23 opportunity.
- 24 THE COURT: Well, I guess, I -- but the question
- 25 would be, what more would you provide that you haven't already

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provided in the case management report?
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2 MS. LIBEU: Right. (indisc.)

THE COURT: I actually did some fairly significant independent research on this question before I got here today, and I've read what you filed, so I'm not sure that there is a lot more to add beyond what's already been filed, and I'm not saying I'm not going to allow it, but let me just put that out there.

Mr. Fischbach, what is your --

MS. LIBEU: Fair enough.

**THE COURT:** -- position on this?

MR. FISCHBACH: Well, Judge, we haven't formally noticed any depositions because we were trying to identify actual dates with plaintiff's counsel. The depositions that were noticed by opponent were done unilaterally -- unilaterally without consulting us on dates. So, I tend to agree with the Court that I don't know that much else needs to -- obviously, we will go out of our way -- I shouldn't say go out of our way, but we -- we will not notice his deposition at an inconvenient location. I suspect it would either be Nevada or potentially Northern California where the Tesla headquarters is. If the plaintiff wants to brief the issue, I suppose that's their prerogative, but I simply agree with the Court on this.

This is what I would like to see done.

THE COURT: Well, let me state this for the record.

Before we're going to

1 get into -- and I think I am inclined to allow additional 2 briefing if we get to that point. But before we get to that 3 point, I think both parties -- and I think I am in agreement that is a little bit premature given that it hasn't been 4 5 However, I do agree with Tesla to the extent that 6 there are limitations that should be placed, and so with 7 those -- with that in mind, I'm not placing limitations on the deposition, but I am directing the parties to do extensive, you 8 know, initial discovery before you get to the point of even 10 doing a notice for his deposition. And by that I mean, are 11 there other employees at Tesla that can be interviewed? 12 there a 30(b)(6) witness that could be deposed that may be able 13 to answer some of the questions that are at issue? Have any 14 interrogatories been issued? Have there been any requests for 15 admission that have been propounded specific to Mr. Musk's 16 Because if he makes admissions, then there may not statements? 17 be a need for the deposition, in and of itself, and it may be 18 avoided entirely. 19 So, I would ask that the parties do that, that 20 discovery, before you get to that point. If at that point, 21 after the discovery has been completed, that you feel that you 22 could do to get to the information you may need and you still 23 believe you need to take Mr. Musk's deposition, then go ahead 24 and notice it up at that point, or at least meet and confer on 25 it and then notice it up, and then if there's still a

1 continuing objection -- because at that point Tesla may not 2 have an objection to a limited two- or three-hour deposition --3 then we can revisit this issue. So, I'm not going to make any decisions with any kind of prejudice, and I am inclined that if 4 5 we get to that point we will go ahead and have some additional 6 briefing, because I expect that the facts are going to change 7 fairly significantly from where we are today to where we would be at that point given the discovery that I would hope would 8 occur. 10 So, to be clear, my ruling is essentially that the 11 parties need to do discovery specific to any issues related to 12 Mr. Musk and his personal knowledge, statements, et cetera, 13 before that deposition notice be given, and I'll leave it to 14 the parties as to what that discovery needs to be, but I have 15 already given you some suggestions. If at that point you 16 believe you need to have the deposition, I would first ask that 17 you meet and confer to discuss with Tesla whether or not you 18 can come to an agreement on how that would be handled, and if 19 you can't, then I would ask that the parties -- let's -- I'm 20 assuming this is not going to happen before February. Is that 21 probably fair to say, Ms. Libeu? 22 MS. LIBEU: I think that's probably fair to say. 23

Yes, your Honor.

24 Mr. Fischbach? THE COURT:

25

MR. FISCHBACH: I think that's probably correct, your

1 Honor. 2 THE COURT: Well, let's plan on this. We'll at least -- we'll include this on our agenda for our next case 3 management conference and see where we're at. If it's still at 4 5 a point where it can't be resolved or it's still pending 6 because of additional discovery that needs to be needed, then 7 I'll go ahead and address how I want the parties to deal with 8 that from a motion practice perspective at that point. So, up 9 to that, that would be my order, as I've already indicated. 10 Is there -- and I'm sorry if I'm not being clear, but 11 is that clear, Ms. Libeu, what I'm indicating I would like the 12 parties to do? 13 MS. LIBEU: It is, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fischbach, any questions from 15 you, sir, or any additional comments? MR. FISCHBACH: No, your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. I think that covers everything 18 that we had in the case management reports. Is there anything 19 specific as to issues between the parties right now, Ms. Libeu? 20 And without getting into the stipulation and order, is there 21 anything else that Tesla would like to raise at this time? 22 MS. LIBEU: Nothing, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fischbach, is there anything 24 additional from Mr. Tripp that you'd like to raise before we

get to the question of the stipulation?

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MR. FISCHBACH: Nothing, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. That takes us back to the question of how long an extension of time should be granted. I've already kind of indicated my thoughts on it. Mr. Fischbach has already given his thoughts, but, Ms. Libeu, I'd like to give you an opportunity to speak to these issues.

MS. LIBEU: Certainly, your Honor. Very briefly.

I'm sure that you have found, in cases that you have, that no matter where you set for the discovery cutoff, that things will lag up until the last minute. Our strong preference is, of course, not to drag out this case longer than necessary. We believe that the initial scheduling order is compliant with the Nevada local rules, which I know Nevada District Court (indisc.) strong preference on having cases completed within a discovery period of 180 days. obviously, extends that, and we're more than happy to agree to that, but we don't think this is a case where we need another We think another two months here is appropriate, in that the parties have done document discovery and written discovery already, so we're really talking about -- and expert discovery. So, we're really talking just about depositions that remain left to be completed in the next -- it's really three months from now. And we think the parties can work together -- they've worked together well so far -- to get those scheduled and completed within the two-month period.

- 1 | think that that's an appropriate length of time.
- 2 THE COURT: Okay. And I appreciate that, and I tend
- 3 to agree that when you have a little bit of fire under your
- 4 | feet you tend to move a little quicker, and when you don't,
- 5 | it's easy to let things kind of go to the wayside.
- 6 So, what I'll do is this. I will go ahead and sign a
- 7 | stipulation order as it's drafted with the dates that we have.
- 8 As I've already indicated, I am going to schedule another case
- 9 management conference for the beginning of February.
- 10 Ms. Clerk, can you give us a date?
- 11 THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor. February 6th, 2019, at
- 12 9:00 a.m.
- 13 THE COURT: Does that work for you, Ms. Libeu, and
- 14 | the plaintiff?
- MS. LIBEU: What did you say? The 6th or the 5th?
- 16 I'm sorry. I didn't hear.
- 17 **THE COURT:** The sixth.
- 18 MS. LIBEU: Perfect.
- 19 **THE COURT:** And, Mr. Fischbach, will that work for
- 20 | the defendant?
- 21 MR. FISCHBACH: Yes, your Honor.
- 22 THE COURT: Okay. And what we can do at that time is
- 23 discuss where we're at, as, obviously, we've already kind of
- 24 discussed anyway, and if there is a need to discuss any further
- 25 extensions at that point we can do that. I think that that

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    makes sense, and I appreciate the statements from Ms. Libeu on
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    that, those issues.
              I quess, at this point, I don't have anything
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 4
              Is there anything further from the plaintiff?
    further.
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              MS. LIBEU:
                          No, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: From the defense?
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              MR. FISCHBACH: Nothing at this time, your Honor.
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Thank you both very much. And,
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    again, I want to again thank you for your filings and how
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    thorough and well done those are. I also want to thank you
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    both for working so well together. I have noticed throughout
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    this litigation that it's been very congenial and very
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    professional, and given the circumstances of this case, I could
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    see where it would be very easy for that not to be the case.
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    So, I do very much appreciate it, and with that, I hope you
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    both have a great day, and we'll be in recess.
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              MS. LIBEU: Thank you, your Honor.
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              MR. FISCHBACH:
                              Thank you, your Honor.
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         (Proceeding was adjourned at 9:43 a.m.)
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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

our / Julian

October 10, 2019

Signed

Dated

TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER